I have always been drawn by the account of humanity’s fall from Eden narrated in Genesis. It strikes as some metaphorically-cloaked, profound truth about human existence. I don’t think I will ever entirely understand its appeal, or its message, but I am especially intrigued by a peculiar dichotomy there. Gen. 2:15-17 reads:
The LORD God took the man and put him in the garden of Eden to till it and keep it. And the LORD God commanded the man, 'You may freely eat of every tree of the garden; but of the tree of the knowledge of good and evil you shall not eat, for in the day that you eat of it you shall die'.
We all know what happens from here. Humankind goes from a state of oblivion to one of knowledge, and in so doing, falls from eternity into a state of mortality. This dichotomy speaks to me, though I know not quite what it says. This story appears to uphold the notion that “ignorance is bliss”, particularly since suffering inevitably accompanies the newly-gained “knowledge” of our primordial parents. However, ignorance here isn’t used in a pejorative sense. For me, this isn’t an ‘ignorance’ comparable to an absence of knowledge, but rather possibly refers to a state transcendent to knowledge, a state beyond the duality of empirical knowing (i.e., ‘knowledge of good and evil’). Perhaps, then, for the sake of discussion, the quest of the mystic can be construed as a re-ascent from a fallen state of ‘knowledge’, back into the ineffable oblivion that is eternity. Human ‘salvation’ would involve, then, a transcendence of a ‘fallen’ state and a return to the blissful state before the intervention of knowledge and suffering. What could this possibly mean though? What could an existence without knowledge of the world, or the self (as represented by Adam and Eve’s self-consciousness about their own nakedness) possibly entail? Who knows? Clearly no one could know, since it is apparently beyond the realm of knowing!
Steven Kats discloses an assumption at the very outset of his paper, “Diversity and The Study of Mysticism”, an assumption from which all of his work proceeds, specifically, that there are no unmediated experiences. To draw upon the aforementioned metaphor, for Katz there is no such Edenic state which humankind may experience the world directly, unfiltered by mental apparatus. Humanity must at all times possess knowledge (however peripherally) of its own nakedness. No experience is blissfully pure, or so Katz assumes. My apprehension about this assumption originates from the fact that it opposes the claims of to whom we subject this assumption. Must we, in the study of mysticism, trespass against the claims of the mystics themselves? If mystics claim that there exists such a thing as unmediated experiencing, then what right do we have, as scholars in the course of investigating such experiences, to proceed on the assumption that they are fundamentally incorrect? Further, I do not understand his basis for believing that different mystics do not in fact refer to the same experience. However, I can potentially see these two points of departure as related. If one cannot have an unmediated experience, then one’s experience must necessarily be tied to one’s individuality, and can thus not be shared by another individual. If one were to allow for unmediated experience, then one allows, too, for the possibility of universality within the realm of mystical experiencing.
Let us examine the notion of common experience among different mystics. In order to truly assess Katz beliefs, I suppose I ought to tackle some of the evidence he gives. My own thinking on the matter is yet quite fuzzy, but I do have some knee-jerk reactions. I was particularly intrigued by his application of logic on the notion of paradox and ineffability (Section V, p 201). He asserts (p 204) that the fact that “(1) Mystic A claims that Experience X is paradoxical and ineffable, while (2) mystic B claims experience Y is paradoxical and ineffable” in no way constitutes evidence equating the experience of A and B. As a matter of fact, he claims that NOTHING can be said about the content of their experience. We can only compare the description of their experiences. But if it is true that we cannot comment on the nature of their experience, and that we therefore have no basis of knowing that their experiences are the same, how, then, can we know that their experiences AREN’T the same?
For Katz, the ineffable seems to refer to one of many possible indescribable states, but I’m not convinced this could be the case. The ineffable for me does not merely refer to something that one cannot describe (because of one’s own limitations), but rather, it refers to that which cannot be described (because of its very nature), that which lies beyond the terrain of empirical knowing. If there are multiple such ‘points’ within the ineffable, would they not be unified in their status as all equally outside the realm of regular knowledge? The ineffable, for me, connotes something singular, or at least something whose plurality (if we chose to conceive of it as such) would exist beyond the threshold of the perception of plurality. Therefore, I am inclined to reject Katz rebuttal of Stace, etc: I don’t see what prevents different mystics from engaging in like experiences.
Furthermore, it strikes me as odd to subject mystical experiencing to the mode of logic as these experiences appear to operate outside of the scope of rationality. Katz himself discusses mystical breakthroughs beyond conventional consciousness with the use of koans, etc. If the path to the experience necessitates a deviation a transcendence of rational knowing (“fundamental to the traversal of the mystical path from consciousness A to consciousness B”, 206), then how could we subject the goal, i.e. trans-rational experience itself, to the mode of logic? Not only do I not follow Katz logic on why mystical experiencing need be variegated and unmediated, I fail to see the logic in relying on logic at all. Clearly rational scrutiny is the necessary instrument of the study of mystical experiencing, we cannot help but cling to it in your academic work. But certainly it cannot be the rod whereby the mystical experience itself is measured.
5 comments:
"I fail to see the logic in relying on logic at all. Clearly rational scrutiny is the necessary instrument of the study of mystical experiencing, we cannot help but cling to it in your academic work. But certainly it cannot be the rod whereby the mystical experience itself is measured."
I think I disagree with the above, though Im not sure Im understanding you correctly. It seems that throwing logic out the window as a means towards better understanding the ends of expereience that only serves to circumvent the need for rational, and realistic study of a phenomenon. It's easy to say "everyone feels something different" but what that ends up sounding like is nothing more than Hallmark Card Humanity. It may well be true, people do not always feel the same about their "experiences" but surely there is some sort of ven diagram overlap to experience. It could be the impetus behind seeking an experience, a shared psychological makeup, a shared ethnicity, a shared anything...Can we not subject commonality to logical scrutinity and suggest some sort of trajectory to logically qualify and quantify experience.
Jackie likes to tell me "oh Chris you've never been to such and such a temple and seen or heard the amazing things..." (not a quote) Which is true, but to me the only logic or rationale that need be applied to religious is experience is that humans are the most profound bullshit artists imaginable. To account for the breadth of our imagination we need only speak of creativity and pathology. When you say you dont know whwat housed more craziness Scientology of CAMH, I will tell you that the commonality to both experiences is simply a profound deficiency in mental equilibrium.
Sorry, I deleted my other comment because it made no sense and because I think I'm confused about something you said - whether mediated experience means individuality and whether unmediated experience increases the possibility of comparison:
"If one cannot have an unmediated experience, then one’s experience must necessarily be tied to one’s individuality, and can thus not be shared by another individual. If one were to allow for unmediated experience, then one allows, too, for the possibility of universality within the realm of mystical experiencing."
What do you mean by individuality exactly? Do you mean subjectivity or do you mean an experience within a particular religion that can't be compared to another religion? I have a feeling I'm totally misunderstanding you, so help!
Hey Michelle, Ok...let me try to clarify...'Unmediated', for me, means that one can have DIRECT experience, i.e., experience which not funneled by concepts, images, etc. Such an experience must necessarily be a mystical experience because our imperical selves necessarily operate via sense organs which interpret vibrations of light and sound which is funneled through our nervous system as electrical impulses which must be interpreted by the human brain. All of these elements mediate between the observer and the experience. We can never know something directly. We only know our perception of it, indeed our experience of it. To know something directly is to have an unmediated experience. Such experiences, according to Katz, do not exists. Also, for Katz, mystics don’t have the same experience. Given the absence of unmediated experiences (for him), this would make sense. All mystics would experience their own, subjective, personal perceptions of some empirically-unknownable metaphysical reality. For all mystics to participate in the exact same experience would mean that they must somehow be experiencing that reality DIRECTLY, and that it is undifferentiated and unmediated by their individual perceptions. You can give me a call and we can talk about what I mean and how it differs from my reading of Katz...don’t lose too much sleep over this though, you have at least one whole lifetime to contemplate existence!!
Hey Raj,
Well, you know already that we disagree on the comparative mysticism issue, which I would be more than happy to discuss after class tomorrow.
What I personally find to be very difficult is defining exactly what "mysticism" is. Is there a definition that could apply to all of the practices and traditions to which we apply this label? I think that this is a very tricky area because their soteriological goals are so different.
And, speaking from a Buddhist perspective, the notion that a return to original avidya, or fundamental ignorance, can be equated with bodhi (awakening) or nirvana, is not tenable. However, I'm sure you could find systems (such as Romantic philosophy) which would support this position.
I agree with you whole heartedly on the ineffability of experiences not necessarily coming from one's personal limitations, but from those of language itself. This may, indeed, be the case with "mystical" experiences. However, this shortcoming of language can be applied to a number of things, and not just these experiences. Imagine trying to describe the taste of an apple to someone who has never tasted one before. Words cannot communicate, or perhaps it is better to say replace, the experience.
Maybe this is what "mystics" are getting at...? Can they talk about it with people who have had the same experience themselves? I'm not sure...
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